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The Return 
of Political Mahdism 
By Jean-Pierre Filiu
T
he Mahdi, or “well-oriented” imam, is a central figure within
Shiism and its various branches. Today, the overwhelming majority of
Shiites follow what outsiders describe as “Twelver Shiism,” which is a
reference to the dynasty of twelve imams initiated at the very dawn of
Islam by Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mo-
hammed. Within Twelver Shiite belief, the twelfth imam, whose ﬁrst name is Mo-
hammed, is still alive, although he is said to have gone into occultation after
disappearing from human sight in 941 CE. It is further believed that this Mahdi or
“Hidden Imam” will reappear at the end of time in order to restore justice and peace
on earth before the Day of Judgment. 
Echoes of the Mahdi’s powers have sounded throughout Islamic history. From
time to time, movements have arisen under the banner of the Hidden Imam, claim-
ing his support and authority to contest the rule of established religious and polit-
ical rulers. Some of these mahdist movements have even succeeded in establishing
their own polities. 
Yet for the most part, mahdist belief has traditionally expressed itself in politically
neutral, even passive, ways within Shiism. This quietist practice derives from many
sources, including the fact that mahdism projects the ultimate showdown between
justice and injustice into a supra-human, other-worldly dimension, thereby dimin-
ishing the relative importance of worldly political action. Moreover, by stressing that
knowledge of the Mahdi and his return is beyond the reach of mere human compre-
hension, Twelver Shiite authorities have generally managed throughout history to
rein in apocalyptic superstitions and to neutralize messianism before it becomes
politically subversive.  
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In the contemporary era, however, a new wave of political mahdism has taken
root in the Shiite world. For instance, the 2005 election in Iran of the overtly mahdist
President Ahmadinejad lent unprecedented support to different, and sometimes
competing, messianic tendencies both in Iran and beyond. Later in 2006, many even-
tually came to celebrate the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah as a “divine vic-
tory” that was achieved with the Madhi’s help. And perhaps most importantly, in
Iraq, following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, a variety of new mahdist movements—
from Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi’s Army, to Ahmad al-Hassan’s apocalyptic group the
Supporters of the Imam Mahdi—have emerged, challenging the authority of more
traditional clerics like Ayatollah Sistani and contesting their leadership of the Shia
community. In light of Shiism’s traditional quietism, these recent expressions of po-
litical mahdism require careful scrutiny. 
The Roots of Mahdism
There is no mention of the Mahdi in the Quran. It is through the Hadith,
or sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed and collected during the ﬁrst two
centuries of Islam, that the Mahdi gained prominence in the Muslim faith. Accord-
ing to this tradition, the Mahdi’s followers, gathered under black banners, will sup-
posedly appear to confront al-Masih al-Dajjal (the false messiah) and his armies of
evil at the end of time. However, according to an alternative Sunni tradition, it is
Jesus (Issa), the eleventh envoy of Allah—rather than the Madhi—who will then come
back to ﬁght (in Syria) and ultimately kill (in Palestine) the Dajjal or Antichrist. In this
view, the Mahdi will always defer to Jesus and let him lead the worldwide commu-
nity of Muslims in collective prayer. 
While Sunni traditionalists constructed this eschatological narrative, Shia scho -
lars developed a rather different version. Devastated by their early failure to ad vance
the cause of Imam Ali and his heirs during Islam’s early civil wars over the rightful
successors to the Prophet Mohammed, Shia scholars began referring to an omnipotent
Mahdi,1 hidden at the heart of inaccessible mountains and protected by wild beasts,
who would one day return to smash the enemies of Islam—including both inﬁdels
as well as deviant Muslims. With the passing of generations, and Shiism’s enduring
exclusion from political power, quarrels deepened among the supporters of com peting
imams. As one consequence of this, Shiism itself became separated into different
branches—including, for instance, Sevener Shiism, which is also known as Ismaïlism.
But a major Shia faction retained its allegiance to Ali’s descendants until the death
of the eleventh imam, Hassan al-Askari, in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 873.
Imam Hassan, as well as his father Ali al-Hadi, had been kept under house arrest
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by the Sunni Abbasid Caliphs, and there were strong suspicions that the imam was
murdered. After Hassan’s death, Shia networks smuggled his four-year-old son Mo-
hammed underground for his protection, and in following years the twelfth imam
addressed his followers only through his sufara (ambassadors). It was during this pe-
riod, which is known as al-ghayba al-sughra (the small occultation), that Imam Mo-
hammed acquired the aura of a full-ﬂedged Mahdi. In 941 the imam’s fourth and last
ambassador announced that the Mahdi had decided to disappear. This was, accord-
ing to Twelver tradition, the beginning of al-ghayba al-kubra (the great occultation),
and this remains the state in which many devout Shia believe the twelfth imam is
still living today.
In the century that followed the start of the great occultation, the doctrine on
mahdism within Twelver Shiism was consolidated. This monumental task was ac-
complished by the Baghdadi Shaykh al-Muﬁd, who selected and organized assorted
traditional pronouncements on the mahdi attributed to the Prophet Mohammed as
well as to the twelve imams in his Kitab al-Irshad (Book of Guidance). After completing
this work, Shaykh Muﬁd even claimed to have received a letter from the Hidden
Imam himself praising his work. 
Shaykh Muﬁd describes how the Mahdi’s return will be preceded by a period of
natural catastrophes and human strife. The cities of Baghdad and Kufa in what is
today Iraq will be struck by rains of red ﬁre, while the Euphrates River will ﬂow out
of its bed. The shaykh didn’t presume to know exactly when the imam’s occultation
will end, but he gives credence to the traditional idea that the Mahdi will reappear
during the Ashura of an even Islamic year. (Imam Hussein, Ali’s son, was martyred
in 680 on the tenth day of the Muslim month of Muharram, which is annually com-
memorated as the Ashura by the Shia worldwide.) When the Mahdi does appear, he
will annihilate all the “hypocrites” in Kufa and from Iraq he will move forth to re-
conquer the world for Islam. Through this re-conquest, the world will be restored to
peace and justice for a period of either seven or nineteen years (the traditions are un-
clear as to exactly how long this will last), and then the ﬁnal Day of Judgment will
come.2
Subsequent Shia scholars eventually agreed that the conﬂagration leading to the
return of the Mahdi—or, more precisely, to the return of his apparition (zuhur) from
concealment—would be marked by a sequence of ﬁve events or signs. These signs 
include: an uprising led by the “Yemenite,” the Mahdi’s advance scout or herald; a
battle with the “Sufyani,” a hypocritical tyrant associated with the Sunni oppression;
the murder of the “Pure Soul,” the Mahdi’s envoy; the “Battle of the Clamors” in
which the Mahdi’s followers shout from heaven in an effort to silence the yells of 
the evil forces from underground; and the engulﬁng and destruction of an evil army
in the Arabian desert.3 After this, the Mahdi will arise as the “Lord of the Age” or 
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the “Lord of the Sword” to lead his “army of wrath” in its re-conquest of the world. 
Once the Shia religious hierarchy had conceived of this eschatological narrative,
it worked hard to establish a monopoly over the interpretation of the signs in an ef-
fort to suppress political mahdism. These efforts by the established Shia scholars to
suppress political messianism were not always successful, however. The Safavid Shi-
ite sect (which originally emerged out of a Suﬁ movement known as the Safawiyya)
rose to conquer Persia at the beginning of the sixteenth century. They revered their
leader, Shah Ismaïl, as the Mahdi himself. The defeat of Safavid forces by the 
Ottoman Army in 1514, however, compelled Shah Ismail to restrain his military am-
bitions. Subsequently, Shah Ismail came to be seen among the Shia as the repre -
sent ative of the Mahdi, not as the Hidden Imam himself. At the same time, Shia
clerics celebrated the Safavid’s success, and they undertook to spread Shiite teach-
ings throughout Persia. To consolidate Safavid control over Persia, these Shiite cler-
ics, too, eventually came to repudiate political mahdism. This complex historical
process led the scholar Zeev Maghen to state that “Shiism as we know it today came
into being primarily as a force for anti-messianism.”4
The Khomeinist Deterrence
The Iranian revolution of 1979 is sometimes portrayed as representing
a break with the traditional Shiite quietism. It is true that when Iran’s revolutionary
rumblings began in the fall of 1978, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini played every card
in his hand to rally the masses against Shah Reza Pahlavi—including the use of subtle
messianic references. Subsequently, Khomeini accepted the prestigious title of imam
and even allowed his followers to indulge in messianic rhetoric. In one notorious
example, Khomeini did not disavow the collective hallucination of November 27
1978, when thousands of his followers claimed to have seen Khomeini’s face in the
moon. 
Since coming to power, however, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have
generally sought to proscribe, or to at least deter, political messianism within their
realm. In fact, as a matter of principle Khomeini adamantly opposed political
mahdism: His break with the traditional Shiite clergy came not on the issues of mes-
sianism, but on the question of political power. During his exile from 1966 to 1978
in Najaf, Iraq, Khomeini developed his political doctrine of vilayat-e-faqih, or rule of
the Islamic jurist, while the Shiite clerical hierarchy based in Qom continued to ad-
vocate a centuries-old separation of religious and political authority. 
After the fall of the shah in February 1979, the Islamic Republic was formed
around a constitution that described its supreme leader as a representative of the
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Hidden Imam. This delegation of supernatural power to the head of state was in line
with the dynastical legitimacy instituted by the Safavids. While the ayatollahs in
Qom resented this confusion of powers, they shared Khomeini’s dislike for messianic
excesses. No individual or sect had the right to challenge the occultation or decipher
the signs. This was the privilege of the religious hierarchy, which prohibited any
messianic attempt to “accelerate” the return of the apparition.
The man who would replace Khomeini, Ali Khamenei, was a revolutionary cleric
from Mashhad, in the Khorasan, where the Islamic Republic had boosted the pil -
grimage to the shrine of the eighth imam, Reza. The Foundation of the Imam Reza
had helped Khamenei in his ascension to power and, after being elected President
of the Islamic Republic in 1981, he was able to expand his power base outside of
Khorasan. In Qom, the Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Bahjat, along with his disciple
Mesbah-Yazdi, supported him in his rivalry for power with other religious leaders.
When Khomeini died in 1989, Khamenei was upgraded as an ayatollah and appoint -
ed as Iran’s Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei has followed Khomeini’s repudia-
tion of political mahdism. 
The next two men to succeed Khameini as president of the Islamic Republic, Ali
Akbar Hachemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005), were
even more hostile to political mahdism than their predecessors. But the 2005 elec-
tion of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran has undermined the mechanisms
proscribing political mahdism within the Islamic Republic. The new president has
repeatedly invoked the authority of the Mahdi in his tirades against his political op-
ponents. And while the post-Khomeini religious establishment has continued to
seek to proscribe political mahdism, Ahmadinejad has given the impression at least
that he is the harbinger of the Hidden Imam, and that he is paving the way for the
actual re-appearance of the apparition of the “Lord of Time.” 
Ahmadinejad is the ﬁrst president of the Islamic Republic to not come from a clerical
background, and his embrace of spiritual and political mahdism represents an effort
on his part to consolidate a power base that is independent of the religious hier archy.
He has attempted to utilize political mahdism in a number of different ways. For ex-
ample, he sponsored the activities of the Qom-based Bright Future Institute (BFI), whose
stated mission is to “prepare scientiﬁc answers to respond to superstitions
surrounding” the Mahdi.5 Since Ahmadinejad’s election, the BFI has or gan ized an
annual international conference on Islamic messianism, which is held on the ﬁfteenth
day of the Muslim month of Chaabane, the alleged birth date of the Hidden Imam.
(Ahmadinejad is also known for delivering rousing public speeches on this date.) The
BFI describes the Mahdi as the “crusader of equality and world peace” and attacks
the “Christian Zionist messianic project [that] represents a fundamental betrayal of
the message of Jesus Christ.”
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Another example of the way Ahmadinejad has attempted to utilize mahdism re-
volves around the Mosque of Jamkaran. During his rule, Ayatollah Khomeini never
felt it was appropriate to visit the Mosque of Jamkaran, which had been built in the
eleventh century near Qom to commemorate the appearance of the Mahdi in a
dream. President Ahmadinejad, however, has sought to dramatically enhance the
prestige of the mosque. Among other things, he has used public subsidies to enlarge
the sanctuary at Jamkaran, which in turn, has meant that the mosque has received
increasing numbers of pilgrims. Not only has this directly undercut the pilgrimage
to the Imam Reza’s shrine in Mashad, the regional power base of Ayatollah Kha -
menei himself, but it has also challenged the traditionalist clerics in Qom who have
impugned the fervor of the pilgrims to Jamkaran, the growing use of the Internet
to send messages to the Mahdi, and the now widely popular belief among these pil-
grims that the Hidden Imam is accessing the sanctuary on a regular basis through
a tunnel. The superstitions ignited by Jamkaran clearly clash with the reigning or-
thodoxy of Iran’s mullahs and, in many ways, is subversive of the clerical hierarchy
and rule. 
Supreme Leader Khamenei has been careful not to publicly support President 
Ahmadinejad’s embrace of political mahdism, and in this regard, he has never wa-
vered from Khomeini’s original stance on messianism. However, as the scholar
Mehdi Khalaji notes, “Khamenei does not hold a political messianic set of ideas, but
his religious mentality, mixed with his ﬁve decades of political experience, makes
him an ambiguous and ambivalent character” with respect to the issue of political
mahdism.6
In contrast, Rafsanjani, who was defeated by Ahmadinejad in the presidential
race in 2005, has been much more explicit in his rejection of political mahdism. As
he has said, 
Some say we have contact (with the Hidden Imam) and the harm
comes when they can deceive people with this philosophy. In every
juncture of history, you will see that this has always existed. This was
the means by which they spread sedition. Today, due to the height of
love that people feel for the Lord of the Age, this sedition is being in-
tensiﬁed.7
The future of political mahdism in Iran is now very much linked to the fate of Ah-
madinejad and, hence, to the outcome of the next presidential election. In the mean-
time, Iran’s religious hierarchy and its supporters at the core of the Islamic Republic
have developed deep-rooted mechanisms to proscribe opportunistic messianic ten-
dencies that might threaten their rule. The outcome of this competition within the
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Islamic Republic between messianic opportunism and the clerical establishment
will shape the future of the regime and the political future of Shiism overall in im-
portant ways. Meanwhile, messianism is a political card that is also being oppor-
tunistically played, marginally but consistently, in Lebanon and Iraq.
Lebanese Ambivalence
Mahdism has played a checkered role in the Islamist politics of modern
Lebanon. In 1975 the Lebanese Shaykh Musa Sadr founded the Brigades of National
Resistance, the ﬁrst full-ﬂedged Shia militia that soon became known by the Arabic
acronym Amal, which means “hope.” Musa Sadr was revered by some as an imam
and, after he “disappeared” during a trip to Libya in 1978, his followers came to re-
gard him as the “vanished imam.”8 Lebanon’s pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Party of God)
movement, which was launched in 1982 and ofﬁcially established three years later,
pursued a revolutionary agenda of militant mobilization, but has nonetheless con-
ventionally eschewed mahdist rhetoric and disavowed messianic expectations. 
In light of this history, it came as quite a surprise when Hezbollah’s deputy secretary
general, Shaykh Naïm Qassem, published a book in 2007 entitled The Savior Mahdi.9
The fact that the ofﬁcial ideologue of Hezbollah devoted his energy and time to write
such a book was in itself remarkable: The book was published, after all, only a few
months after Hezbollah’s grueling 33-day confrontation with Israel. But in the book,
Qassem wrote that public longing for the Mahdi had inspired “the movement of the
apparition” and he cited many signs announcing the dawning of an “era of the [Mahdi’s]
apparition.” This increase in messianic activity, as Qassem sees it, is the direct con-
sequence of “Iran’s march forward, launched by the holy Imam Khomeini and led
by Imam Khamenei” (the supreme leader is very seldom called “imam” inside Iran).
Although Qassem praised this upswing in messianic fervor, he was careful not to
embrace mahdism overtly and to declare himself or any other living person in pos-
session of any special knowledge of the Mahdi’s return. This ambivalence is typical
of Hezbollah’s recent attitude toward mahdism, which is still eschewed by Hezbollah
ofﬁcials, but is tolerated (and even encouraged) in the areas of Lebanon that Hezbollah
controls. For instance, a secular publisher named Shadi (Faris) Faqih has written a
series of inexpensive booklets on popular mahdism that are easily found in Beirut,
southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, as well as being sold at the Iranian cultural
center in Damascus. One of these, Ahmadinejad and the Next World Revolution, claims
on its front cover that “Ahmadinejad is the leader of the Mahdi’s forces that will liberate
Jerusalem.”10
Faqih describes a complex sequence of seventeen signs leading to the apparition
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of the Mahdi. The thirteenth of these signs is the rise of Khamenei, who is identiﬁed
with the Mahdi’s standard-bearer al-Khorassani. The fourteenth sign equates Ah-
madinejad with Shuaib Ibn Saleh, the Mahdi’s chief of staff. The remaining three
signs, which involve horrendous battles and massacres, will precede the Mahdi’s
coming and subsequent triumph.
Faqih furthermore describes the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah as a “di-
vine victory” in which the Mahdi himself and his holy sword Zulﬁkar took part. He
portrays white-winged Hezbollah ﬁghters ﬂying and falling upon the Zionist enemy.
He hails the missiles that hit Haifa as a “miracle,” and declares the war with Israel
as the opening skirmish in cycle of doomsday battles.11 Convinced that we now “are
in the era of the [Mahdi’s] apparition,” Faqih completes his apocalyptic cycle by iden-
tifying the Hezbollah secretary general, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, as the “Yemenite”
who, according to tradition, acts as the herald of the Hidden Iman.  He has further-
more announced that Saudi King Abdullah will be the last ruler of Hejaz, where the
Mahdi will soon appear.12
Hezbollah can rightfully claim that Faqih’s popular mahdist literature represents
the views of an independent writer who has repeatedly acknowledged his lack of of-
ﬁcial sanction. At the same time, Qassem’s book Savior Mahdi did not rebut this apoc-
alyptic literature, and no one tried to stop Faqih from asserting that Nasrallah is the
long-awaited Yemenite. This ambivalent attitude toward messianic expressions is
even more pronounced in Moqtada Sadr’s militia in Iraq. And while Iranian or Iran-
ian-inspired mahdism has generated much debate, the importance of Iraq in con-
temporary messianism is of particular signiﬁcance. 
Moqtada’s Gambles on the Mahdi
The year 1977 marked a watershed in relations between Iraq’s Baath regime
and its Shia community. The government’s ban on the Ashura celebrations led to vi-
olent unrest in the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala. In the same year the Hoja-
toleslam Muhammad Sadeq Sadr, a junior but ambitious cleric, published a treatise
about the Mahdi with a foreword by his cousin and master, Ayatollah Muhammad
Baqer Sadr. This ﬁfty-page text foreword became so popular that it was sold as a
booklet all over Iraq. Baqer Sadr depicted the Mahdi as a man of ﬂesh and blood who
was actually living among human beings, though they were unable to discern his
presence. He claimed that modern means of communication and transport en-
hanced the possibility of the return of the Mahdi’s apparition and the implementa-
tion of his global rule.
In this and similar ways, Baqer Sadr directly challenged the quietism represented
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by traditional Iraqi clerics led by Ayatollah Abulqassem Khoï. After further being
emboldened by the Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran in 1979, Sadr’s open de-
ﬁance of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship only escalated. Subsequently, after a
Baathist death squad killed Baqer Sadr in April 1980, his followers, led by Sadeq Sadr,
kept alive the legacy of this “martyred ayatollah.”
When Khoï died in 1992, Sadeq Sadr, who was by then an ayatollah, advanced his
claim to be the religious leader of the Shia community. And during the subsequent
years of the international embargo against Iraq, and the widespread degradation of
living standards, his stance became increasingly militant. In April 1998, Sadeq Sadr
decided to organize Friday prayers against the wishes of the Najaf establishment,
which had previously ruled in support of suspending the prayers until the Mahdi re-
turned (or his representative was designated). Open to Sunni as well as Shia, these
prayers gained in political prominence. They unsettled Saddam Hussein, and he or-
dered the assassination of Sadeq Sadr in February 1999.
Moqtada Sadr was a 25-year-old student in Najaf when his father Sadeq was mur-
dered. He married a daughter of the “martyred ayatollah” Baqer Sadr, and emerged
as an early leader of the so-called “embargo generation” that grew up in the horrible
destitution and oppression of Iraq in the 1990s. Soon after the American invasion of
March 2003, the neighborhood of Baghdad known as “Saddam City” was renamed
“Sadr City” to honor the memories of the martyred Ayatollahs Baqer and Sadeq Sadr.
Moqtada, however, was unable to capitalize on this Shiite revival, and he quickly
learned that he lacked the personal authority to organize and to lead the Shia com-
munity. As eminent Shia clerics began returning to Iraq from exile (mainly from
Iran), Moqtada sought a new way to supplant their authority and to establish himself
as a leader within the Shia community. He did so by appealing to a source of au-
thority that was higher than the clerical establishment, and by branding the militia
that he had formed the “Mahdi’s Army.”
Moqtada’s appeal to the Mahdi was a stroke of political genius. While the Badr
Brigade, the military arm of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), and other Shia factions were much better organized and equipped, the
Mahdi’s Army gained such political momentum that it was able to sustain a weeks-
long confrontation with American forces in the spring and the summer of 2004.
Moqtada never directly indulged in messianic rhetoric, but his often underpaid and
undertrained militiamen found in the mahdist pretense a welcome compensation
for their misery—as well as a justiﬁcation for their violent actions. 
After al-Qaeda bombed the shrines of the tenth and the eleventh imams in Samarra
in February 2006, the Mahdi’s Army was at the forefront of battles against “Baathists”
and “terrorists” that often ended in anti-Sunni ethnic cleansing, especially in Baghdad.
In August 2007 Moqtada’s followers chose the Mahdi’s alleged birth date, the ﬁfteenth
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day of the Muslim month of Chaabane, to confront their Shi’a rivals and the security
forces in Kerbala. Though the resulting popular outrage led Moqtada to suspend his
militia’s military activity, the Mahdi’s Army did not disband, and its networks con-
tinued to challenge any gestures by Shia leaders to reconcile with American “inﬁdels.”
Moqtada Sadr moved to Iran to complete his religious studies and escape the hos-
tility in Najaf. (The excesses of his militia did nothing to win “hearts and minds” in
Shia seminaries there). In August 2008 he publicly commemorated the Mahdi’s sup-
posed birthday and asked his followers to renew their pledges of allegiance to the
Mahdi—not to himself—with their own blood. This request was anything but ortho-
dox, mixing rites of tribal loyalty with centuries-old superstitions. In this way, Moq-
tada indicated that he was still trying to tap into popular mahdism to help himself
stage a political comeback. 
The Doomsday Militia in Southern Iraq
Moqtada’s invocation of the Mahdi was not unique within Iraq, however.
As early as 1998, long before Moqtada launched the Mahdi’s Army in the wake of the
American invasion, Ahmad al-Hassan claimed that he was appointed to rule the
Shia (wassi) by the Hidden Imam. Not surprisingly, Hassan came from Basra in south-
ern Iraq, which for a number of reasons, has historically been a fertile area for
mahdist movements. Some of the main southern Iraqi tribes converted to Shiism as
late as the nineteenth century13 (which meant that they were less inﬂuenced by
Twelver quietism), and the sheykhya version of Shiism, which denies the moral guid-
ance of the ayatollahs, remains to this day an inﬂuential teaching among them.
Moreover, a vibrant nationalism, with hints of xenophobia, also nurtures the popu-
lar deﬁance of “Persian” clerics, whether they preach in Qom or Najaf.
In the late 1990s Ahmad al-Hassan organized his followers into a movement
known as Ansar al-Imam al-Mahdi (Supporters of the Imam Madhi). While his early
followers were no doubt zealous believers, some accused Hassan of being an agent
of the Baathist regime that had executed Moqtada Sadr’s father. After the U.S. led in-
vasion of 2003, Hassan began railing against the “American Satan,” asserting that the
occupation of Iraq by inﬁdel forces was the prelude to the end of time. Hassan’s fol-
lowers then began to refer to him as the herald of the Mahdi, or as the “Yemenite”—
a title that Hassan willingly accepted. Hassan furthermore branded the United States
the Antichrist that was to be defeated in the doomsday confrontation,14 and he pub-
licly demanded that Ayatollahs Sistani (of Iraq) and Khamenei (of Iran) pledge their
allegiance to him on the basis of his messianic mission. 
Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who is the heir to Baqer Sadr as well as a supporter of 
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Moqtada Sadr, attacked Hassan from Qom and repudiated his pronouncements.15
But Hassan, the self-appointed harbinger of the Mahdi’s return, was not deterred
by this condemnation; in fact, he claimed that the doomsday angels Gabriel, Michael
and Asraﬁl were supporting him.16 His followers credited Hassan with such “mira-
cles” as the mystical uncovering of the real tomb of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet
Muhammad and wife of the Imam Ali. The movement’s declarations were sealed
with the Star of David, with Hassan’s name glowing at its center.17 His devotees fur-
thermore staged marches and organized ceremonies marking the holiest occasions
of the Shia calendar, during which they viliﬁed established Shiite clerics in Iraq and
Iran for not believing in the end of the Mahdi’s great occultation.
Hassan developed his doctrine and networks for disseminating his propaganda.
His movement launched its own newspaper, Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path)—
a name that refers to the opening lines of the Quran. It also began an Arabic website,
www.almahdyoon.org, as well as websites in Persian and English. The English site as-
serts that in the Book of Revelation, “Babylon refers to Iraq, as it was the capital of
Iraq at that time. And all massacres and riots will happen in Iraq and on Iraqi land.”
The “lamb,” which is not mentioned anywhere in the group’s Arabic pamphlets,
gains prominence on the website’s English pages: Those “invited to the feast of the
lamb,” the sites states, “are the comrades of the ﬁrst Mahdi, the Yemenite.” Further-
more, the site claims that Saint John is supposed to have prophesied Hassan’s mis-
sion in southern Iraq.
Some of the most radical members of the Supporters of the Imam Mahdi estab lished
a camp with their families in the city of Zarga, not far from Najaf, where they became
known as the “Soldiers of Heaven.” In late January 2007, during the Ashura of the Islamic
year 1428, the Iraqi government warned that the Soldiers of Heaven was planning an
armed uprising in Najaf, and further accused Hassan of plotting to murder Ayatollah
Sistani (as well as other major Shia religious ﬁgures). The Iraqi government then moved
to crush the Soldiers of Heaven, and hundreds of people were killed in the ensuing
bloodbath, including many women and children trapped in the besieged camp. 
Baghdad claimed that the “rebels” wanted to take over Najaf during the 1428th
Ashura in a bid to fulﬁll the prophecy that the Mahdi’s apparition would return during
the Ashura of an even year. The Iraqi army led the assault against the Soldiers of Heaven,
but U.S. forces were involved as well. (Two American soldiers died when their helicopter
crashed.) Tehran, incidentally, wholeheartedly supported this campaign against the
mahdist movement, backing the Iraqi government’s claim that the Soldiers of Heaven
represented a messianic insurgency with murderous designs.18
Hassan himself denied any responsibility for the bloodbath at Zarga, which may
have helped him shed some of his most extremist followers.19 Yet the Supporters of
the Imam Mahdi have continued to recruit new members, and now claim to number
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ﬁve thousand all over the southern provinces. The group’s newspaper announced
that many local commanders previously loyal to Moqtada Sadr had, in fact, defected
from the Mahdi’s Army and subsequently pledged their allegiance to the “Yemenite”
Hassan. And, during the following Ashura in January 2008, the movement deployed
an aggressive militia that humiliated the security forces in Basra. Dozens of people
were killed in two days. Hassan ordered his ﬁghters to withdraw to their safe houses,
but he declared that the blood of the “martyrs” would be revenged.
Iraq is now home to a full-ﬂedged madhist militia movement. It is extremely dif-
ﬁcult to assess the real dimensions of the phenomenon because of the disparity be-
tween the accounts of the Iraqi government and Hassan’s disciples. The Supporters
of the Imam Mahdi might be seen as just one more Shiite militia in an insecure
country where tribal groups and criminal networks have produced numerous sim-
ilar groups. But among these movements, the messianic message of Hassan’s move-
ment is quite unique, and the fact that it has been able to attract new recruits —
including from Sadr’s Mahdi Army—makes it difﬁcult to treat this particular
mahdist movement as insigniﬁcant.
Indeed, in many ways, southern Iraq is now the main arena for the evolution of
militant mahdism. Whether Moqtada’s followers come to adopt a more genuine and
active form of messianism is likely to be critical. And the very existence of a self-pro-
claimed Yemenite and his apocalyptic militia adds an ominous dimension to this
new reality. These developments must be carefully studied. 
More generally, the return of political mahdism in Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq has
sent shockwaves throughout the Shiite world, where it has challenged the tradi-
tional quietism and authority of the highest ayatollahs. Engaging in eschatological
rhetoric and playing to popular messianism has thus far proven to be a convenient
and effective way for radical Shiite leaders to increase their political power. This has
been especially the case for ambitious men like Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Moqtada
al-Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah, who cannot realistically hope to reach the top levels
of the clerical hierarchy. The forthcoming Iranian elections (in which Ahmadinejad
will be running for re-election) will likely shed some light on whether political
mahdism will remain an asset or become a liability for these men as well as other
aspirants to leadership of the radical Shia movement. 
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